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Abstract The paper examines the relations between presentism and the thesis
concerning the existence of the flow of time. It tries to show that the presentist has to
admit the existence of the passage of time and that the standard formulation of
presentism as a singular thesis saying that only the present exists is insufficient
because it does not allow the inference of the existence of the passage of time.
Instead of this, the paper proposes a formulation of presentism with the aid of the
notion of becoming; not only does a formulation state the existence of the flow of
time in such a way as to avoid the question of the rate of the passage of time, it also
allows the inference of the existence of only present things and events. The paper
demonstrates that the proposed conception of presentism also has other virtues, such
as homogeneity, non-triviality, and ability to express dynamicity of presentists’
image of the world which testify for it.
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1 Introduction
The issue of how we should grasp the relations between presentism and the
existence of the flow of time is a vague and unclear one. Some philosophers assume
a single, standard ontological thesis saying about the existence of only the present
while others claim that an acceptable formulation of presentism should entail the
temporal passage in the form of temporal becoming,1 and there still others who
& Jerzy Gołosz
jgolosz@iphils.uj.edu.pl
1 Department of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, ul. Grodzka 52, 31-044 Krako´w, Poland




claim that the thesis about the existence of the flow of time is a fundamental claim
of presentism.2 There are even philosophers who claim that ‘‘Time does not pass
given presentism.’’3 So it is an important metaphysical problem which cries out for
clarification.
The majority of presentists introduce their view simply in the form:
P1 Only the present exists
4;
or that
P2 Only the present is real.
5
Such forms of presentism were criticized as leading to the triviality problem. The
problem consists in saying when we examine the ontological theses of presentism
that only the present objects exist, it turns out that both these ontological theses are
trivially true or trivially false, depending on the way in which we understand the
verb ‘‘exists’’: in a tensed or tenseless way.6 That is why many presentists—to avoid
the triviality problem—transform their main ontological thesis into a more
sophisticated form:
P3 The domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers only includes the present
objects7;
or
P4 Only present things exist simpliciter
8;
or
P5 Necessary, if x exist simpliciter, then x presently exists.
9
Presentists maintain—contrary to the claims of the adherents of the opposite
views—that the past and the future do not exist, or that they are not real, or are not
in the domain of our most unrestricted quantifiers, or that do not exist simpliciter.10
They unanimously agree that the past was and that the future will be.
2 See Gołosz (2013: 54–56, 2015: 813–819).
3 Tallant (2010: 140).
4 See, for example, Merricks (1995: 523).
5 See, for example, Hinchliff (1996: 122–123).
6 See, for example, Savitt (2004). He precisely shows that the application of the predicate ‘‘being real’’
leads to the triviality problem because when we try to specify the predicate ‘‘being real’’ in opposition to
‘‘being imaginary’’, and when we ascribe unreality to the past and the future, the triviality problem
revives.
7 Sider (1999: 327), for example, claims that the presentist ontological position can be expressed in such
a way.
8 Sider (2006: 76), for example, claims, that presentist can formulate their thesis with the aid of Lewisian
(1986: 3) notion of exist simpliciter.
9 Hestevold and Carter (2002: 499).
10 There are some opposite views to presentism: according to eternalism, the past, the present, and the
future exist; according to growing block universe, only the present and the past exist; according to
shrinking block universe, only the present and the future exist. The last two views admit existence of the
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As it was recalled above, they sometime also assume, explicitly or implicitly, that
the flow of time exists. Thus the important ontological issue arises: is the claim
about the existence of the passage of time necessary for presentism? Perhaps it is
unnecessary, or can it even be denied, as is claimed by Tallant (2010)? And maybe
we should assume that it is a sufficient condition for presentism? It is the aim of this
paper to examine these difficult questions: the problem of the necessity of the
existence of the passage of time for presentism is examined in the second section,
while the third section deals with the issue of whether the thesis about the existence
of the flow of time in the form of becoming is sufficient for defining presentism. The
paper ends with some conclusions.
2 Is the Existence of the Flow of Time Necessary for Presentism?
What I claim is that we should answer the question posed in the title positively. It
was first noticed by St. Augustine that we should choose such an answer although,
of course, he did not state the problem in such a form. In the well-known 11th book
of the Confessions he wrote:
Boldly for all this dare I affirm myself to know thus much; that if nothing were
passing, there would be no past time: and if nothing were coming, there should be
no time to come: and if nothing were, there should now be no present time. Those
two times therefore, past and to come, in what sort are they, seeing the past is now
no longer, and that to come is not yet? As for the present, should it always be
present and never pass into times past, verily it should not be time but eternity. If
then time present, to be time, only comes into existence because it passeth into time
past; how can we say that also to be, whose cause of being is, that it shall not be: that
we cannot, forsooth, affirm that time is, but only because it is tending not to be? (St.
Augustine 1912: 239).
St. Augustine claims here, as presentists do, that there is only present, and the
past is no longer, and the future is not yet.11 And he wrote in this passage also that if
nothing passed away, the time called the past were not; and if nothing were coming,
the time to come were not either; and if nothing were, then the time called the
present could not be either. This means nothing other than that if the flow of time
did not exist, the present would not exist either, and in such a case we could not
claim that the past was and the future will be. And because the adherents of
presentism maintain that the past was, that the future will be, the present exists, and
Footnote 10 continued
flow of time and the next two views do it as well; according to the shrinking tree, the world is represented
by a tree and the trunk represents the past, the first branch point is the present, and the branches constitute
the set of all physically possible futures, and the flow of time is responsible for the progressive branch
attrition (McCall 1995: 155). And according to moving spotlight, there are past, present, and future
events, and the present is represented by some kind of ‘‘moving spotlight’’ (see e.g. Merricks 2006;
Dainton 2010). I am concentrating on presentism in this paper.
11 In what follows, I am interpreting this passage literally, that is, I assume that St. Augustine treated time
and the flow of time as objective phenomena. Russell (1945: 354), for example, interpreted St.
Augustine’s theory of time as subjective.
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that there was a time when our present events were in the future, they must admit
the existence of the flow of time. The only possible alternative to avoid this
conclusion is to understand the past as those events and things which are earlier
than, the future as those events and things which are later than, and the present as
those events and things which are simultaneously with a given moment of time. This
maneuver, however, would lead to the static block universe of the eternalist in
which everything exists tenselessly in their proper spacetime location and where
there is no place for passing away and no place for the coming to be of events. Such
a situation seems be inconsistent with what St. Augustine wrote about time and is
also not acceptable for presentists. So, it follows from this that the presentists has to
admit the existence of the flow of time; that is, they must accept the condition which
I will call St. Augustine’s condition:
St. Augustine’s Condition Presentism has to admit the existence of the flow of
time.
And now the essential issue arises of whether any of the presentists’ theses P1–P5
alone really satisfies St. Augustine’s Condition. So the question is whether the
existence of the flow of time can be inferred from the theses P1–P5 alone with no
other assumption. Some philosophers claim that it is really possible. For example,
Hestevold and Carter (2002) declare in their paper that ‘‘[a]n acceptable formulation
of Presentism should make clear that Presentism implies Transient Time’’
(identified with the temporal becoming or the temporal passage),12 while at the
same time they claim that the main ontological thesis of presentism ought to be
stated in the last form mentioned above:
Necessary, if x exist simpliciter, then x presently exists (2002: 493).
They claim that the presentism formulated in such a form implies a thesis termed
by them Transient Time:
Transient Time: it is possible that objects and events undergo (in some sense)
temporal becoming; in an irreducibly non-tenseless sense, it is possible that there
did exist or did occur objects or events that do not presently (or will not),
respectively, exist or occur; and it is possible that there will exist or will occur
objects or events that, respectively, do not presently exist (or have not yet existed)
or do not presently occur (or have not yet occurred).13
Transient Time is contrasted by the authors with Static Time:
Static Time: Nothing can undergo temporal becoming; with respect to any
(tenselessly) existing object or event, there cannot be an irreducibly non-tenseless
sense in which it presently exists or occurs, did exist or occur, or will exist or
occur.14
Does Hestevold and Carter’s presentism really imply transient time? The authors
claim that it does and introduce an argument which will be examined below. The
12 Hestevold and Carter (2002: 493).
13 Hestevold and Carter (2002: 493). The notion of possibility applied in this definition is vague; is it
possible, for example, that Hestevold and Carter do not undergo temporal becoming?.
14 Hestevold and Carter (2002: 493).
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mistake made in this reasoning is informative because it also shows why no other
form of presentist thesis of the form P1–P4 can infer temporal becoming or the
temporal passage alone. Hestevold and Carter’s argument has the following form:
1. Presentism is correct and transient time is incorrect. [assumption for reductio
ad absurdum].
2. If presentism is correct, then Mozart exists only in the sense that there did exist
something that was Mozart.
3. If transient time is incorrect, then there is a sense in which
4. Mozart exists other than the sense that there did exist something that was
Mozart.
5. If transient time is correct, then static time is not correct.
6. Therefore, Mozart exists only in the sense that there did exist something that
was Mozart. [from 1, 2]
7. Therefore, there is a sense in which Mozart exists other than the sense that
there did exist something that was Mozart. [from 1, 3]
8. Therefore, Mozart exists only in the sense that there did exist something that
was Mozart and there is a sense in which Mozart exists other than the sense
that there did exist something that was Mozart. [from 5, 6]
9. Therefore, it is false that both presentism is correct and transient time is
incorrect. [from 1, 7]
10. Therefore, either presentism is incorrect or Transient Time is correct. [from 8]
11. Therefore, if Presentism is correct, then transient time is correct. [from 9]
12. Therefore, if presentism is correct, then static time is not correct. [from 4,
10]15
It is easy to show that this reasoning is invalid because the second step is not
justified. To see this let us imagine a simple model of the possible world W exactly
similar to our present world W at some fixed moment t0, but such that in W
 there
existed nothing in the past of t0, and there will exist nothing in the future of t0. It
would be a static world with a momentary present at t0 but without a flowing time,
with no events and no things which existed in the past of t0, and similarly without
events and things which will exist in the future of t0. It would be a ‘‘frozen’’
presentism, which, of course, is not in agreement with our experience, this is,
however, not at issue. The point is that in the world W Hestevold and Carter’s
presentism is true and that it does not allow the inference from the presentist
assumption of the (past) existence of any past event and any past object like, for
example, Mozart. It means that the second step in the argument is not justified and
the whole argument is invalid.
What is important, all other versions of presentism P1–P4 are true in the world W

, which means that it is impossible to infer from such ontological theses alone the
existence of the flow of time. Of course, I do not support such a version of
presentism: although such a view is logically consistent, it is not in accordance with
our experience of the world and as such is of no interest for presentists. What I claim
15 Hestevold and Carter (2002: 500–501).
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rather, after St. Augustine, is that presentists have to accept the existence of the flow
of time and the theses P1–P4 alone do not suffice to define presentism.
There is one more argument in favor of the acceptance of the existence of the
flow of time by the presentists. Namely, the presentists who do not assume the
existence of the flow of time are vulnerable to attacks similar to that launched by
Lewis (1986: 207), who claimed that every view denying existence of the future is
implausible and irrational:
Consider the philosophers who say that the future is unreal. If ever anyone is
right that there is no future, then that very moment is his last, and what’s more is the
end of everything. Yet when these philosophers teach that there is no more time to
come, they show no trace of terror or despair!16
The presentists who assume the existence of the flow of time have no reason to
despair: due to the existence of the flow of time, although the future does not exists
at present, there is more time to come and—for better or for worse—there will exist
in the future for sure.17
If it is impossible to infer the passage of time from the theses of the form P1–P5,
then perhaps presentists should define their position as a simple conjunction of one
of these theses and a second concerning the existence of the passage of time?
Certainly, it would be a better definition of presentism because St. Augustine’s
condition would then be trivially satisfied. Nevertheless, such a solution has at least
two flaws. Firstly, presentism defined with the aid of the two theses makes use of
ontological notions of a different character: whatever notion we will apply to
introduce the flow of time, it has to have a dynamic character, while the notion of
the existence in the first thesis has a static character and such a solution would lead
to an inhomogeneous view.18 Secondly—and which I will try to show is more
important —is that the thesis concerning the existence of the flow of time in the
form of becoming, when properly understood, suffices to conceptualize presentism
in a satisfactory way. This problem will be discussed in the next section.
3 Is the Existence of Becoming a Sufficient Condition for Presentism?
The usage of the notion of becoming to express the passage of time seems to be the
most promising approach because it allows us to avoid the intractable question of
the rate of time’s passage and Broad (1938) introduced his primitive notion of
absolute becoming just to avoid the question about the rate of time’s passage. He
noticed that the passage of time cannot be referred to itself because then the ratio of
the same two quantities expressing the rate of time’s passage is meaningless.
Neither can the passage of time be referred to a second time dimension, because in
such a case the problem of the flow of time revives leading to regressus ad
infinitum. He wrote in his famous quotations:
16 Lewis (1986: 207).
17 See also Gołosz (2013: 55).
18 This is just the reason why attempts to define the flow of time with the help of a kind of a ‘‘movement’’
of the present are impossible.
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To ‘‘become present’’ is, in fact, just to ‘‘become’’, in an absolute sense; i.e., to
‘‘come to pass’’ in the Biblical phraseology, or, most simply, to ‘‘happen’’.
Sentences like ‘‘This water became hot’’ or ‘‘This noise became louder’’ record facts
of qualitative change. Sentences like ‘‘This event became present’’ record facts of
absolute becoming. (Broad 1938: 280–281)
I do not suppose that so simple and fundamental a notion as that of absolute
becoming can be analyzed, and I am quite certain that it cannot be analyzed in terms
of a non-temporal copula and some kind of temporal predicate (Broad 1938: 281).
So, according to Broad, the flow of time consists in the (absolute) becoming of
events. He ascribed absolute becoming to instantaneous events: he wrote that they
come to pass, that is, that they come into existence to cease to be, where ‘‘existence’’
is understood in a tensed sense. If they ‘‘come to pass’’ or come into existence to
cease to be, this means that they did not exist and will not exist although they come
into existence at present. This is a clearly dynamic sense of becoming which is in
agreement with our understanding of the passage of time. What is also important is
that because it is said here that the events, which are now present, did not exist and
will not exist, this conception of becoming fits perfectly well presentism, according
to which there are no future and past objects. It is important since there are other
ontological views which accept existence of the flow of time such as, for example,
growing block universe, shrinking block universe, shrinking tree, or moving
spotlight, which admit existence of the past or/and future objects and the notion of
becoming assumed here excludes them.
The above interpretation of becoming as a dynamic process of coming into being
to cease to be proposes the literal understanding of ‘‘coming to pass’’, which seems
to be in agreement with Broad’s intentions. A quite different interpretation was
suggested by Savitt (2002), who proposed interpreting it in a minimalist way to
receive the ‘‘Radical Middle’’ (2002: 161) between Broad and the well-known critic
of the passage of time D. C Williams (1951):
Absolute becoming, as explained by Broad, is just the happening of events. Since
events are located at various times or moments, they happen at various times or
moments. Some events have happened, some are happening now, and others, we
hope, will happen eventually. Some events occur simultaneously, some earlier than
others, some later. Absolute becoming is the ordered occurrence of (simultaneity
sets of) events. (Savitt 2002: 159–160)
Is this attempt at squaring the circle credible? Unfortunately, it seems
implausible. Savitt—although he is known as a presentist—identifies the future
with the events which happen later than others, the past with events which happen
earlier than others, and the present with events which happen simultaneously with
others in a typically eternalist way and thus this results in the static eternalist world
where there is no place for coming to pass. He ignored the key expression ‘‘come to
pass’’ in his interpretation which was used by Broad to introduce dynamics to his
becoming, and interpreted ‘‘happen’’ in the static, tenseless way as ‘‘happen at time’’
—later, earlier, or simultaneously with other events—and as a result strips
becoming of all of its dynamics. Such a notion of becoming is not in agreement with
Broad’s intention and is useless for presentists.
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Now, after assuming the dynamic interpretation of becoming, what remains is to
introduce the notions of present, the past, and the future. So, to finish the
construction of the proper definition of presentism, we only need to recall what
presentists understand as the present. And there is a long tradition in presentism of
identifying the present with what exists. To justify this claim, I recall some passages
from Prior and his followers:
[T]o say that my lecture is present is just to say that I am lecturing—flat, no
prefixes. The pastness of the event, that is its having taken place, is not the same
thing as the event itself; nor is its futurity; but the presentness of an event is just the
event. The presentness of an event is just the event. The presentness of my lecturing,
for instance, is just my lecturing (Prior 1970: 247).
To be present is simply to be, to exist, and to be present at a given time is just to
exist at that time—no less and no more (Christensen 1993: 168).
On a presentist ontology, to exist temporally is to be present. Since presentness is
identical with temporal existence (or occurrence) and existence is not a property,
neither is presentness a property. Presentness is the act of temporal being (Craig
1997: 37).
So, it follows from this that the presentist can identify the present with the totality
of events that exists, and in a similar way the past with the totality of events that
existed but ceased to be, and the future with the totality of events that will exist but
do not yet exist. Now, if we recall Broad’s thesis about the passage of time as
becoming of events, that is as their coming into existence to cease to be, we can
easily see that Broad’s becoming leads precisely to the presentists’ ontological
consequences, just those which form the presentist’s thesis P1–P5: events that we
call present come into existence to cease to be. It means that no other ontological
thesis is needed with the exception of the definition of the present, the past, and the
future assumed above. In this way we gain an essential advantage over the standard
formulation because the proposed one is only expressed with the aid of one thesis—
which satisfies the St. Augustine Condition. It can be true or false, nonetheless it is
certainly not trivial; Broad does not say that the present becomes or comes into
existence. He says that events become or come into existence to cease to be. And
Prior adds that we understand or define the present as that which exists. What is
perhaps crucial is that neither Broad’s thesis nor Prior’s definition are trivial.
So presentism can be expressed, as I have tried to show, in the form of one thesis
which I will call becoming:
Becoming Events which our world consists of become or come into existence to
cease to be.19
This thesis is to be completed by the three definitions:
The present : The totality of events which become or come into existence.
The past : The totality of events which became or came into existence.
19 A similar definition of presentism was proposed in Gołosz (2013: 54).
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The future : The totality of events which will become or will come into
existence.
This analysis was performed in the language of events, but there is no difficulty
to carry out it in the language of things (or things and events). To this end, it would
be enough to recall Sellars’ notion of becoming which was ascribed to things: ‘‘only
things can become in the sense of come into being,’’ (1962: 556) and to swap in the
above analysis terms ‘‘events’’ for the terms ‘‘things’’ (or for the terms ‘‘things and
events’’).
I would like now emphasize some virtues of such a formulation of presentism:
1. It satisfies St. Augustine’s Condition, while no other form of presentism
formulated as single thesis of the form P1–P5 does so.
2. It allows the expression of a dynamic character of reality, which presentism in
the form of a single thesis of the form P1–P5 is not able to do.
3. It avoids the question of the rate of the passage of time because—as emphasized
by Broad’s—the notion of becoming is primitive and unrelated to anything else,
and especially not to time.
4. This formulation of presentism also avoids the triviality objection because the
main thesis about the becoming of events (or things) is not trivial.
5. This formulation of presentism is consistent and—which should also be
emphasized—homogenous: it is not composed of concepts of different types.
All these virtues seem to suggest that the proposed conceptualization of
presentism should be assumed as the correct one and a better one than the standard
formulation.
4 Conclusions
The paper has tried to show that presentism has to admit the existence of the flow of
time to be in accordance with our intuitions concerning the present, the past, and the
future. It also tried to demonstrate that the thesis concerning the existence of the
flow of time in the form of becoming, when properly understood, suffices to
conceptualize presentism in a satisfactory way. That is, it can be treated as the most
fundamental thesis of presentism, from which we are able to infer the ontological
thesis about the existence of only these events (and things) which we call the
present. Such a formulation of presentism has some important advantages over the
standard formulations, as I tried to show: it is homogenous, avoids the question
about the rate of time passage, it is undeniable non-trivial, and emphasizes the
dynamic character of the presentist’s image of the world. Because it gives us
important benefits, it is worth considering it to be the successor to the traditional
formulations.
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